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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether multinational restaurant firms (MNRF’s) have higher
agency and expected bankruptcy costs. Given this expectation, this may have an impact on the amount of debt
incurred by MNRF’s. Overall, the findings are consistent with the existing literatue in terms of the positive
relationship between MNRF’s and agency and bankruptcy cost. However, it was found that MNRF’s also have
more total debt. This is surprising given the higher agency and bankruptcy costs. The importance of this
research is that there may be considerations other than agency and bacnkruptcy costs affecting the capital
structure decisions of MNRF’s.
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Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt 
in Multinational Restaurant Firms 
By -4mn Upneja and  Michael C. Dalbor 
The purpose of thispaper i~ to under,-land whether mnuitinationai n ~ ' f a ~ ~ r i ~ n t , f i s  lM,\XFS) have 
higherageng and expected banknlpf!] ,.ofti. Giuen t b i ~  e.\?eciation, fh~.i n19 have av impazf on ihe amount nf 
dvbt inlxrnd 5 ;2LVRFi Oueraii. thefinding UP Lonsistenr with the tlwsting literaturt in terms cfthepo.ii/ive 
 lat ti on ship beiween M.2W:r and agenq, and bunknlpty lasts. However, ii wa.i,+knd that MTTTRFI ah-o have 
mart toial debt. This i.r a rirprising rtsuiigiuen the b@rr ,ujeny atid bankruptil. cosi~. The importance ofthis 
rtseanh is that thert maq. be consideration.i other than agng and banknqtg ~,osts aftcling thr. capila/stnrctun 
Iiision $ A t W  >. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper 1s to assess the relationship between agency costs, b a n h p t c y  
costs and the use of debt in multinational restaurant fums (XINRF's). The underl!lng tradeoff is 
between the benefits of international diversification against the expecred increases in agency and 
bankruptcy costs from the use of debt. 
This research represenrs a continuation of work done regarding capital structure. 
Capital structure has been actively researched in the field of hnance since the seminal work of 
Modigliani and Mtller (1938). More recendl-, a stream of research has begun in the field of 
hospithty (Sheel, 1994; Kim, 1997; Dalbor and Upneja, 2004). However, much of the 
hospitality Lterature in this area has focused primarily on domestic firms or has paid r e n  little 
attention to the multinational aspects of companies. International revenues are becoming more 
important to the industry. McDonald's, for example, is a component of the Dow- Jones 
Industrial Average and is one of the most well-known hospitality fums. In 2004, it derived more 
than 65 percent of its total revenues from outside of the United States. ;\ccordingIy, the 
significance of this research is that it extends an understandng of the factors that influence the 
capital structure decision of hfNRF's. 
One of the motivations for this research is to continue to investigate the lmk between 
diversification benefits for multinational fums and capital structure. One theoq is that 
multinational Grms invest in countries that are negatively correlated with the Cnited States, 
initially lowering their risk. This subsequently alloms them to take on more debt. This 
diversification benefit was confumed by early research conducted by Hughes, Logue and 
SweeneJ- (1975). However, Reeb, Kurok and Baek (1998) find that multinational firms have 
more risk. This may be from an increase in sysrematic risk due to extra cschange rate risk as 
suggested by Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996). In terms of capital stmcture, Lee and Kwok 
(1988) find chat multinational f m s  use less debt than theit domestic counterparts. One reason 
for investigating the capital structure of hfNRF's is to assess whether the benefits of 
dmersification outweigh the extra agency monitoring costs in a multinational ern.ironrnent. 
hfultinational f m s  grow in different ways. hIany indusmal f m s  will build and own 
facilities overseas. This is not always the case for restaurants. As an example. Yum Corporation 
is the largest hmRF with about two-thirds of its stores operated by franchsees. Moreover, this 
does not mean chat Yum does not bear the same type of risk a company owned manufacturer. 
For example, at the end of 2004 Yum Corporation aa s  contingentl!. liable for lease payments 
totaling $365 million. Addtionall!-, the company provided guarantees on loan pools to 
franchisees of $16 million and various lettrrs of credit totaling $21 million during this same 
period (Yum Corporation, p. 70). Thus. drect ownership is not a nccessa? condtion to bear 
the risks of international expansion. 
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An important consideration in this type of research is the dehition of a MNRF. There 
is no single dehition of a multinational firm that is recognized within the f i n a n d  literature. 
Differing variables such as the nationality of management, the number of different counmes in 
which h s  do business and sales or profits have been used. When attempting to use either 
sales or profits, sales are generally considered superior because of the smaller likelihood of 
eamhgs manipulation. 
Lee and Kwok (1988) address this issue by using the foreign tax ratio, or the percentage 
of total taxes paid to foreign governments. In their research, Lee and Kwok used a wide variety 
of firms to increase their sample size. Here, the research is limited to one pamcular industry, the 
use of the foreign tax ratio severely limits the sample size available for analysis. In addition, 
there is a possibiity of manipulation of the foreign tax ratio through use of transfer pricing and 
other accounting techniques. Finally, we had to determine a cut-off point for foreign revenue as 
a percentage of total revenue, to dassify the firm as foreign or not. Again there was no uniform 
number used in the literature. Therefore, this study was begun using an arbitrary number (10%) 
and said that if the firm has to derive at least ten percent or more ofits revenue from Foreign 
sources it would be classified as a MNRF. Use of different levels of threshold amounts does not 
m a t e d y  change the results. 
The capital stmcture of multinational firms is a relatively recent endeavor for capital 
structure researchers. The common capital structure model according to Megginson (1997) is 
shown: 
VL = Vu + Tax Shield - Expected Bankruptcy Costs - Agency Costs 
Where VL is the value of the levered firm and Vu is the value of the unlevered firm. As 
shown in the equation, the value of the firm is increased by the present value of the tax shield of 
the deductibility of interest payments and decreased by expected bankruptcy and agency costs. 
We hypothesize that differences in expected bankruptcy costs and agency costs will have 
an impact on the capital structure of MNRF's. Specifically, firms with higher costs are less likely 
to have debt in their capital structures. O w  research finds that MNRF's have hgher agency 
costs, but bankruptcy costs are indeterminate. The overall effect in o w  research is that there is a 
positive relationship between MNRF's and total debt despite the increased agency costs. 
Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and Internationalization 
Agency costs associated with debt 
Research conducted by Myers (1977) hypothesizes that capital structure choice is related 
to the agency costs of debt. Myers argues that firms ha7.e real options whose value is dependent 
upon further discretionary investments. Examples of these investments include advertising and 
research and development costs. If bondholders have a contract that matures after the 
expiration of a real option, the benefits will accrue primarily to the bondholders. Myers refers 
this as the underinvestment problem; where shareholders pass up projects with positive net 
present values. 
Bondholders, aware of this potential problem, take all of this into consideration. 
Therefore, because of this underinvestment risk to the shareholders, bondholders will pay less 
for the debt securities of the firm. This reduction in purchase price, paid by the bondholders, 
represents an agency cost to the firm. The more a firm spends on research and advertising costs, 
the higher the agency costs and the potential for underinvestment by the firm. These costs have 
been used in previous research as proxies for agency costs by Lee and Kwok (1988) and Bradley, 
Jarrel and Kim (1984). 
Another agency cost to the firm is the substitution problem hypothesized by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). The owners of the firm will have an incentive to engage in risky project that 
transfers wealth from bondholders to the shareholders. Speaficdy, the upside potential of the 
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project accrues to the shareholders while an!- downside loss is borne more by the bondholders 
than the shareholders. There are two h'pes of agency costs associated with t h s  problem. The 
frst cost is the reduction in price paid for the firm's bonds by bondholders (simidar to the 
underinvestment prohiem). Secondly, because of the potential for a substitution problem, 
bondholders nill most likely require bond covenants and monitoring of fum activities. These 
activities represent real costs to the h .  Thus, the low-er price paid for the bonds along with the 
costs of bond covenants are all considered agency costs of debt. 
The agency costs of debt can have a particular effect on the capital suucture ofhNRF's  
as hypothesized by Kwok and Reeb (2000). They ar-pe that given the wider diversity of hINRF 
operations, it takes greater effort to monitor the actions of a multinational firm. Therefore, this 
would dscourage the use of deht. r\dditionally, the authors argue that that hlNRF's have more 
real options, thereby bondholders are less &g to pay the price for debt. Both of these points 
support the notion that a MNRF would have less debt in its capital strucnue than a DRF. 
Agency costs and the use of debt in hospitality firms 
Capital structure research in hospitality is an emerging field. Sheel (1994) examines the 
potential determinants of debt use by hotel and manufacturing firms. f i s  research only includes 
domestic 6rms and excludes restaurants. Gu (1995/96) attempts to test the pecking-order 
theory of financing by using a sample of domestic lodging and m a n u f a c n ~ ~ g  h s .  Upneja and 
Dalbor (2001) and Dalbor and Upneja (2002) examine the use of debt by domestic restaurant 
firms and Gnd key determinants to be f m  sue, age and fum risk (positive) and growth 
opportunities (negative). Debt is used by larger and older f m s  as an effective monitoring agent 
to help reduce the agency costs associated with potential empire buildmy by management. On  
the other hand, restaurant h s  ulth large growth opportunities may choose less debt because of 
the peckng order as detined by Myers (2001). 
Further research by Dalbor and Upneja (2004) hnd a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and total debr for domestic lodging h s .  This is mfferent from restaurant 
f m s  as growth opportunities for lodgng h s  can involve expansions, renovations or 
acquisitions that have tangible value for lenden even in the case of Gnancial distress. Overall, 
whde there has been capital structure research in the hospitality, none has covered or focused on 
the behavior of multinational restaurant h s .  Also, the results of previous studies indicate the 
hospitahty i ndusq  may not he homogeneous in terms of capital strucrure choice. 
Bankruptcy costs and debt 
The relationship between the use of hnancial leverage and potential bankruptcy costs 
has been ambiguous in the hterature. The first theory is parallel to using international 
investments to reduce the variance in a portfolio. I s  discussed by Shapito (1978), a company 
developing overseas operations can reduce the rolatility of expected cash flows, subsequently 
reducing the hkehhood of h a n h p t c y  and its associated costs. .iccordingl!., a MNRF should use 
more debt. 
Kwok and Reeb (1998) develop an extension of the international &versification 
hpothesis. The!- argue for an "upstream/downsneam" effect where less developed countries 
represent increased risk, leading to the use of less deht by the intemadonal h .  On the other 
hand, expansion into a relatively dex-eloped country represents less risk, and \x-ould therefore lead 
to the use of more debt. Therefore, the use of debt is dependent upon the condition of the 
country into \\.hich operations are being expanded. 
Another approach is taken by Khambata and Reeb (2000). A h m R F  has operations in a 
variety of international locations, subject ro a large variety of legal jurisdictions. \ \Me holding 
bankruptcy costs constant, the hrterogenciq of lenders' rules and regulations increases the costs 
of potential bankruptq. Therefore, the authors argue that this would lead to a MNRF to use 
less deht in the capital smlcrure. 
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There seems to be a consensus in the recent capital structure literature regarding 
internationalization and agency costs. Higher agency costs are assodated with 
internationalization and therefore those firms should use less debt. But, there seems to he no 
consensus on the effect of bankruptcy costs and debt in the multinational firm. Because of the 
conflict between the diversification and upstream-downsaeam hypotheses, there is no a priori 
expectation of a relationship between the use of debt and bankruptcy costs. 
Empirical evidence from Lee and Kwok (1988) indicates that multinational firms do 
have lugher agency costs than domestic firms. In terms of bankruptcy costs, the authors find 
that multinational firms do not have lower bankruptcy costs than domestic firms after 
controlling for firm size. Size is accounted for in their research by grouping the firms by amount 
of assets and placing each firm in one of seven categories. 
The authon also tested the multinational and domestic firms for debt ratios and found 
that domestic h s  have k h e r  debt ratios. However, this was not true for all industries. 
Domestic industries with lower debt ratios indude mining, textile, publishing and primary metals. 
Moreover, the authors did not examine any hospitality firms such as hotels or restaurants. 
Upneja and Dalbor (2001) examine the use of debt and expected bankruptcy costs for 
domestic restaurant firms. While they find a positive relationship between firm risk and debt 
use, this merely confirms the pecking order theory of Myers (1977) rather than address the 
lugher potential bankruptcy costs for restaurant firms, whether they are DRF's or MNRF's. 
While bankruptaes and their associated costs are lugh for small private domestic restaurant 
firms, it remains an empirical question for publicly traded MNRF's. 
Measurement of agency costs and expected bankruptcy costs 
As previously discussed, a MNRF would be expected to have lugher agency costs. 
Myers (1977) argues that research and development expenditures and advemsing expenditures 
create Future opportunities for the firm that may or may not be utilized. Accordingly, the greater 
the amount of expenditures, the greater the potential for underinvestment by the owners and 
thus, lugher agency costs. 
Lee and Kwok (1988) use the percentage of sales represented by advemsing and 
research and development costs as proxies for agency costs. This had also been used in other 
studies including Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984). We use a similar measure, although we do not 
expect a large amount of research and development expenditures in our sample. 
As argued by Lee and Kwok (1988), bankruptcy costs can generally be expected to 
remain constant. Therefore, expected bankruptcy costs are largely a factor of the probability of 
bankruptcy. Although Lee and Kwok use the variability of cash flows as a measure of this, we 
have decided to use Ohlson's Revised O Score as used by Dalbor and Upneja (2002). This score 
makes use of number of key ratios to effectively predict bankruptcy and has been used in other 
hospitality capital structure research (Upneja and Dalbor, 1999). 
Hypotheses to be tested 
Based on the established theory, we propose two alternative hypotheses: 
HI: There is a positive relationship between agency costs and MNRF's. 
HZ: There is a positive relationship between bankruptcy costs and MNRF's. 
If the tirst hypothesis were correct, then this would appear to indicate that MNRF's 
would use less debt. On the other hand, if MNRF's have lower expected bankruptcy costs, this 
would indicate that they would use more debt. Since these two elements are in contradiction, it 
is uncertain which factor has greater influence on the overall debt in the capital structure of the 
firms in the sample. Accordingly, we propose a third altemative hypothesis to assess the 
relationship between total debt and MNRF's. 
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H3: There is a negative relationshp between total debt and IvINRF's 
We were prepared, ~n fact, that the results could indcate an opposlte effect dependmg 
on the balance of agency costs of debt and expected b a n h p t c )  coqts. 
Methodology - Data sample 
The sample ofrestaurant € i s  is from the COhlPCSTAIT database for the years 1980 
through 2004. \Ye excluded from our analysis f m s  that did not have data for d ~ e  ntire period. 
However, d ~ e  exclusion was selective, based on the regression model. Only those f m s  were 
excluded for each model that did not have the required data for that model. For example, the 
variables required in the first regression are agency costs, size, and an indicator variable for 
multinational character of the f m .  Note that the Ohlson's revised 0-score is used on17 in the 
second regression model, therefore obsen-ations were not excluded if they d d  not have the 
required information to calculate the Ohlson's 0-score. Therefore, the exclusion for the first 
model was based onlj- on the three variables required for the first model. In the second model, 
we excluded based on the requirements of the second model. The number of obsen.ations for 
each model varied from 38 to 90. Summa? statistics of the data are provided in Table 1 and a 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. 
SIZE 101 2.000 1.420 0 4 
XKRF 101 0.406 0.491 0 1 
The table lists the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
regression analyses 
Terms used: 
AC: agency costs of the Grm represented by the ratio of advertising and research and 
development costs to total sales. 
DR: total debt ratio and is defined as the total debt of the &I (both long and short 
term) dvided b>- total assets. 
OR: Oldson's revised 0 score, a mcasure between 0 and I inlcating die probabhty of 
bankruptcy (1 is the highest probabilin-). 
SIZE: categorical rariablc with the frms divided into five categories based upon the 
log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest firm while 5 is the smallest fum. 
hlNRF: an inlcator variable where 1 is a multinauonal restaurant frm. 
Because the number of obsen-ations varied between the three models, the correlation 
ma& is shown in three panels in table 2. Each panel corresponds to each of the three 
regression models. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix by Regression Models* 
Panel A: Correlation matrix for first re esslon model AC = Size + MNW 
Variable 
0.13 
MNRF 
Panel B: Co ize + MNRF 
Panel C: C 
*Because there were different numbers of observations in each model 
resulting in different values for correlations between the same variables, we 
deaded to show the correlation ma& separately for each model. 
Terms used: 
AC: agency costs of the h represented by the ratio of advertising and research and 
development costs to total sales. 
DR: total debt ratio and is defined as the total debt of the h (both long and short 
term) divided by total assets. 
OR: Ohlson's revised 0 score, a measure between 0 and 1 indicating the probability of 
bankruptcy (I is the hghest probability). 
SIZE: categorical variable with the fums divided into five categories based upon the 
log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest h while 5 is the smallest h. 
MNRF: an indicator variable where 1 is a multinational restaurant firm. 
Methodology - linear models 
Our methodology uses general linear models to invesdgate the relationship between 
agency costs, expected bankn~ptcy costs and debt ratios and MNRF's. We considered a h that 
has more than 10 percent of its sales From international sources to be a MNRF. Additionally, to 
alleviate any size bias, we placed the h s  into 5 different categories based upon the number of 
assets under thek control. The largest h was a 1 and the smallest is given a 5.  This is 
consistent with Lee and Kwok (1988). Accordingly, the three linear models are as follows: 
A C = a , , + a l S I Z E + a 2 M N R F +  e i .  
O O R = a o + a l S I Z E + a z M N R F +  ~ i .  
D R = a , , + a l S I Z E + a z M N R F +  e i .  
Where: 
AC = the ratio of advertising and r&d expenditures to total sales 
OOR = Revised Ohlson's 0 score, a predictor of banhptcy and an indicator of expected 
bankruptcy costs 
DR= the ratio of total debt to total assets 
SIZE = indicator variable based upon total assets 
MNRF = variable indicating if the iirm is multinational 
q = the error terms of the model. 
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Results 
The regression results are- shown in Table 3. Thc table reports rrgression results for the 
three regresslon models. 
Table 3: Regression Analysis Results 
1 I Dependent I 1 1 1 ( .idj.R2 I 
I Repession I ~ariablr I Intercept I SIZE I hLKRF I F* ("d, 
1 I AC 1 0.03 I -11.01 I 0.03 1 1.'3* 1 6.88 
Terms used: 
AC: agency costs of the firm represented by the ratio of advertising and research 
and development costs to total sales. 
DR: total debt ratio and is detined as the total debt of the firm (both long and short 
term) dmided by total assets. 
OR: Ohlson's revised O score, a measure between 0 and I indtcating the 
probabdiq of b a n h p t q  (1 is the hlghest pr t~babih~) .  
SIZE: categorical rariable with the Grms divided into five categories based upon 
the log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest firm while 5 is the 
smallest t i i .  
M N W  an indicator rariable where 1 is a multinational restaurant f im. 
2 
3 
The f is t  regression shows the results with agent!- costs as the dependent variable. r\fter 
taking into consideration the size of  the f i r ,  there is a sipticant and positive rrladonshp 
between hINRF's and agency costs. This result c o n f i s  previous research with other f m s .  
indicating that more costs have to be iticurred to reduce the information as!.mmem regardmg 
the firm as it expands mternationall~. 
The second regression sho\\~s the rrlationship between hliVRF's and espected 
bankruptcy costs as operationalized by the revised Ohlson's 0 Score variable. The predicted 
sign of the MNRF variable was indeterminate a prioi because of tbc relative importance of 
exactly where a firm was going to expand overseas. But after taking size into consideration, the 
result supports the notion that risky f i s  take on more debt ox-eraU as found by Dalbor and 
Upneja (2004) for domestic restaurant firms. 
* Significant at p < .05. 
OOR 
DR 
The final regression shou~s the relationslup brtween La'RF's and total debt. Given tlre 
higher agency and b a n h p t ~  costs shown in the f is t  two regressions, we espected to find a 
negative relationshp between hCNRF's and total debt. Insrcad, we find a significant and positive 
relationslup between hfNRF's and total debt. 
This unexpected result could be for a number of reasons: 
(5.55)- 
0.38 
(8.86)-' 
0.55 
(12.97)'- 
The MNRF's ma>- be more "mature" than cxzecred. thus they may have less growth 
opportunities and accordmg to hlyers' (1977) pecking order theor). of financing, 
would use more debt. 
We have used total debt as a dependent variable, which could include a substanaal 
amount of short-term debt, u,lnch is easier to re-tinance. 
( - I  0') 
. 1 6  
( - j l l ) . '  
0.05 
(~1.99). 
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MNRF's may have more locations that are actually owned instead of leased. Real 
estate ownership would seem to imply greater use of debt that is secured by valuable 
tangible assets such as land and building. 
It should be noted that we ran other regression models using different measures for total 
debt. We ran a regression with total current liabilities as the dependent variable and another 
model with long-term debt as the dependent variable. Both regressions indicated a significant 
and positive relationship with MNRF's and the measure of debt continning the results of our 
otiginal model. 
Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
This research examines the relationship between agency costs and expected bankruptcy 
costs and MNRF's. Our 6rst result supports the existing literature that states that these types of 
firms should incur higher agency costs. Our bankruptcy cost model has borderhe significance, 
but the sign of this coeffiaent was indeterminate because of the dependence upon the location 
of foreign expansion. Additionally, we find that MNRF's use more total deb\ a result that was 
unexpected. 
The results generated by this research warrant further investigation. Overall, operational 
characteristics of MNRF's should be examined in greater detail to understand the similarities and 
differences as compared to domestic fums. Additionally, agency costs in general, and for the 
restaurant industty in particular, need to be better dehned. Moreover, more research should be 
conducted as to the appropriate definition of a multinational restaurant firm. There is no current 
consensus on this issue an4 unfortunately, a consensus may not be forthcoming anytime soon. 
The research hghl~ghts the very fluid siruation confronting research into mu&-national 
activities. Firms are s d  experimenting with investment structures and there are still surprises 
when doing research in this area. 
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Appendix 
The revised 0-score (probability) of bankruptcy is calculated in the following manner: 
First, we calculate the numerical value of the probability of bankruptcy. The second step is 
to calculate the 0-score that represents the probability of bankruptcy. 
The revised 0-Score ranges from 0 (exaemely low probability of bankruptcy) to 1 (indicutinz a 
iW%pmbabi/io a/bankmptg). The procedure for calculating the revised 0-score is based on the 
equation below. 
Revised 0 Score = 1/(1 + e~N9 
An explanation of the variables is shown below. 
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